Are there ‘greener’ ways of doing transitional justice?:Some reflections on Srebrenica, nature and memorialization by Clark, Janine
 
 
Are there ‘greener’ ways of doing transitional
justice?
Clark, Janine
DOI:
10.1080/13642987.2016.1218113
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Clark, J 2016, 'Are there ‘greener’ ways of doing transitional justice? Some reflections on Srebrenica, nature and
memorialization', The International Journal of Human Rights. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2016.1218113
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Rights on 31st August
2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13642987.2016.1218113
Verified 27/10/2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 Are there ‘greener’ ways of doing transitional justice? 
Some reflections on Srebrenica, nature and memorialization 
 
Janine Natalya Clark 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The year 2015 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. Two particular 
events, however, overshadowed the annual commemorations at the Potočari Memorial 
Centre. The arrest of the former Bosnian army commander, Naser Orić, in the run-up to the 
commemorations, and the attack on the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, in 
Potočari, not only detracted from the victims and their suffering. These events also 
highlighted the heavy politicization of Srebrenica and its memorialization. The purpose of 
this article, thus, is to explore possible bottom-up ways of memorializing Srebrenica’s dead 
and missing as a complement to the annual state-led commemorations. Drawing on the field 
of ‘green criminology’, it introduces the concept of ‘green’ transitional justice and the 
concomitant idea of ‘green’ memorials. The article’s central argument is that incorporating 
nature and the environment into the process of dealing with the past creates opportunities for 
more inclusive forms of transitional justice – and specifically memorials – that empower 
victims and local communities. To develop the concept of green memorials, it utilizes the 
notion of civic ecology. 
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Introduction 
 
More than 100 women were packed like sardines into a room, many of them sitting on the 
floor. They chatted loudly, enjoying this opportunity to be together. The lively sounds which 
drifted through the house, mixed in with the delicious smells of homemade Bosnian cooking, 
contrasted sharply with the stillness and silence outside. Only a barking dog could be heard 
somewhere in the distance. The scene was Potočari, in eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH). 
The women had come together, as they did every other Saturday, to socialize and exchange 
news with each other. They were the wives, mothers and sisters of some of the Bosniak men 
and boys killed during the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995. Their fortnightly group 
meetings were made possible by Snaga Žene (Women’s Strength), a Bosnian non-
governmental organization (NGO) that has been working with and supporting women in 
Potočari and Srebrenica for more than a decade. As part of its occupational and horticultural 
therapy-based approach to post-trauma healing, Snaga Žene has provided these women with 
roses, seeds, medicinal herbs, greenhouses and gardening tools to help them re-build their 
lives without their loved-ones.1 
 
Opposite the Potočari Memorial Centre, where those killed in the genocide are buried, a 
Bosniak woman who lost her husband and son in the bloodshed runs a small shop. She 
established the business with the aid of Snaga Žene and she sells, among other items, the 
roses which local women grow. She sits in her small shop all year round, waiting for 
customers. She likes to keep busy and to be out of the house. Business is slow during winter 
months. In contrast, huge crowds descend on the Potočari Memorial Centre on 11 July each 
year, for the annual commemorations of the genocide. Like the women gathered in the nearby 
house, she complains that politicians only care about Srebrenica once a year. And then they 
get back in their cars and leave. The heavy silence thus returns.  
 
Memorials are an important part of transitional justice, the process of dealing with the legacy 
of past human rights abuses. However, political interests frequently shape and influence 
memorial practices in post-conflict societies.2 The example of Srebrenica exemplifies this. 
Such politicization, in turn, highlights the broader point that transitional justice processes are 
often driven from the top down,3 resulting in the marginalization of local voices and on-the-
ground needs.4 For scholars and practitioners working in this field, thus, a key challenge is to 
identify and develop more bottom-up ways of theorizing and doing transitional justice that 
counter-balance elite-driven approaches. This is essential for building the type of ‘holistic’ 
transitional justice that Boraine has called for.5 
 
This article takes as its starting point the twentieth anniversary commemorations, in July 
2015, of the Srebrenica genocide. The genocide was an inherently political event and, 
inevitably, the process of official memorialization that surrounds it is similarly politicized. 
The purpose of this research, thus, is not to look for means of ‘de-politicizing’ the annual 
commemorations in Potočari. However, by analyzing two particular events – in June and July 
2015 – that critically detracted from the victims of the genocide, it poses a fundamental 
question: are there more bottom-up, community-driven ways of remembering Srebrenica that 
squarely put the victims and their families first? Drawing on the concept of ‘green 
criminology’, which quintessentially addresses ‘environmental crimes and environmental 
harm, from a criminological perspective’,6 this article introduces the idea of ‘green’ 
transitional justice. It argues that integrating nature and the environment into the process of 
dealing with the past provides a basis for developing more grassroots forms of transitional 
justice that primarily reflect local needs rather than macro political agendas. More 
specifically, it explores the notion of ‘green’ memorials, concretizing the concept by 
examining how other societies have harnessed the power of nature in memorial processes. 
The article is not suggesting that green memorials offer an alternative to the annual 
commemorations in Potočari. Nor is it arguing that green memorials are a superior form of 
memorialization. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that they constitute a grassroots complement 
to official state-led commemorations – and thus a potential starting point for developing more 
‘holistic’ memorial practices.  
 
Instrumentalizing Srebrenica 
 
In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces, led by General Ratko Mladić, overran the town of 
Srebrenica, supposedly a United Nations (UN) ‘safe area’.7 In the months preceding the fall 
of Srebrenica, the humanitarian situation in the enclave became increasingly desperate. 
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ‘Many 
Bosnian Muslims in the Srebrenica enclave were forced to beg for food and some resorted to 
searching the DutchBat [the UN peacekeeping force based in Potočari] garbage dumps’.8 On 
6 July 1995, the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) began its military offensive against Srebrenica, 
gaining complete control of the enclave just five days later. Women and children flocked to 
the DutchBat compound in search of safety and protection. They were subsequently put on 
buses and taken to Bosnian army-controlled territory. The ICTY notes that ‘By the early 
evening of 13 July 1995, all of the Bosnian Muslims – excluding the wounded and sick – had 
been transported out of Potočari’.9 Large numbers of men fled through the forests in the hope 
of reaching safe territory. Others were taken to various locations in and around Potočari soon 
after the fall of Srebrenica; and ‘Most of the men separated at Potočari on 12 and 13 July 
1995 have not been seen alive since’.10 More than 7,000 people were ultimately killed in and 
around Srebrenica in July 1995. The ICTY has indicted 20 individuals for crimes committed 
in Srebrenica.11 Of these, four defendants – namely Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara, Zdravko 
Tolimir12 and Radovan Karadžić – have been convicted of genocide.  
 
The importance of criminal trials notwithstanding, transitional justice is much broader than 
legal accountability. It comprises the ‘full range of processes and mechanisms associated 
with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses’.13 Dealing 
with these past abuses, however, is an inherently political process; and one that elites can co-
opt to protect their own interests and/or to propagate a particular version of ‘truth’ that 
bypasses ‘inconvenient facts’ about the past.14 As Rubli underlines, ‘…various [political] 
actors attempt to shape a transitional justice process…so as to ensure that they are favourable 
to them and that they reflect their ideological preferences’.15 Srebrenica is a poignant 
example of such ‘shaping’, and this is visible in four key ways. 
 
Firstly, Srebrenica can be viewed as a ‘chosen trauma’,16 the atrocity which Bosniak 
politicians have elevated above all others. Representing the ultimate crime and the apex of 
man’s inhumanity to man, and ‘unique in terms of its magnitude and concentrated time 
frame’,17 it is Srebrenica that has most firmly cemented the image of Bosnian Muslims as the 
victims of the Bosnian war. For this very reason, it has intrinsic political value, not least in 
deflecting attention from the crimes committed by the Bosnian army in eastern BiH in 1992 
and 1993.18 This political utility has, in turn, sometimes encouraged a cynical 
instrumentalization of Srebrenica. According to Hodžić, for example,  
 
There is hardly a single Bosniak politician in power or opposition who did not fall for 
the temptation of profiting from what has become an orchestrated, macabre spectacle of 
mass burials on 11th July, where masses descend for the televised ceremony, pierced by 
columns of expensive cars carrying VIPs who must be seen to sympathize with the 
mothers of Srebrenica only to leave before the first shovels of earth are thrown into the 
graves.19 
 
Secondly, when the ICTY determined that the crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 
constituted genocide,20 this was an example of what Edkins terms ‘codification’; and once an 
event is codified, ‘the traumatic experience is something that can be appropriated’.21 One 
illustration of this appropriation is the persistence of highly politicized debates over how to 
define Srebrenica, with both the Serbian government and the government of Republika 
Srpska remaining steadfast in their refusal to acknowledge the commission of genocide. 
Serbian Prime Minister Vučić, for example, has gone only as far as categorizing Srebrenica 
as ‘a big, horrific crime’;22 and in June 2015, the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad 
Dodik, scornfully described Srebrenica as ‘the greatest deception of the twentieth century’.23 
This genocide denial and the political appropriation of the meaning of Srebrenica are an 
attempt to exert control over how the war is remembered, and such control ‘is crucial for the 
Republika Srpska’s claim to legitimate existence within the international system…’.24 
Realpolitik, in other words, plays a central role in determining how the past is remembered 
and made sense of. 
 
Thirdly, although the ICTY’s trials have been fundamental in helping to establish and expose 
the facts pertaining to the fall of Srebrenica and the ensuing genocide, they have been far less 
successful in creating a common, cross-ethnic truth regarding these events. Indeed, the 
ICTY’s work, and the strong on-the-ground resistance that it has so often generated, has 
arguably helped to entrench rather than to weaken competing ethnic narratives.25 The result is 
that any developments related to Srebrenica are inherently political and interpreted as such. 
When the aforementioned Naser Orić was arrested in April 2003, for example, and 
transferred to The Hague to stand trial at the ICTY, some 200 Bosniak women from 
Srebrenica protested in Tuzla, describing Orić’s arrest as ‘an act of hatred towards the 
Moslems’.26  
 
Fourthly, the issue of Srebrenica has often exposed political divides within the international 
community. In 2015, for example, ahead of the twentieth anniversary commemorations, the 
British government drafted a Resolution on Srebrenica, according to which ‘acceptance of the 
tragic events at Srebrenica as genocide is a prerequisite for reconciliation’.27 On 8 July 2015, 
however, during a vote in the UN Security Council, Russia vetoed the Resolution (and 
Venezuela, Angola, Nigeria and China all abstained from voting). Moscow’s ambassador to 
the UN, Vitaly Churkin, additionally described the British-drafted Resolution as ‘not 
constructive, confrontational and politically motivated’.28 Given that Russia is a close ally of 
Serbia, none of this was unforeseeable. Afterwards, the Serbian President, Tomislav Nikolić, 
described Russia as a ‘true and honest friend’.29 
 
The politicization of Srebrenica culminates in the annual commemorations of the genocide. 
On 11 July each year, politicians, government ministers and dignitaries flock to the Potočari 
Memorial Centre to honour the dead. And each year, one is struck by the enormous contrast 
between these ‘men in suits’ and the grieving women whose loved-ones were prematurely 
taken away from them. As Halilovich emphasizes, ‘What we should be reminded of…is that 
for the Srebrenica survivors, regardless of where they live today, “Srebrenica is not just a 
once a year event” but an everyday reality’.30 In July 2015, the ‘once a year event’ in 
Potočari became even more disconnected from the reality of what Srebrenica represents to 
those left behind. Specifically, in the run-up to and during the twentieth anniversary, two 
particular events occurred that deflected attention from the victims and the crimes committed 
in Srebrenica. 
 
 
The political overshadowing of the twentieth anniversary commemorations 
 
The arrest of Naser Orić 
 
On 30 June 2006, the ICTY Trial Chamber sentenced Naser Orić, the former senior 
commander of Bosnian Muslim forces in eastern BiH, to two years’ imprisonment for 
violations of the laws or customs of war, in a judgement that lists a series of crimes against 
Serbs in and around Srebrenica.31 Two years later, however, the Appeals Chamber acquitted 
Orić. It emphasized that:  
 
Where an accused is charged with command responsibility pursuant to Article 7(3) of 
the Statute, as in the present case, the Prosecution must prove, inter alia, that his 
subordinate(s) bore criminal responsibility and that he knew or had reason to know of 
his/their criminal conduct. The Trial Chamber made no findings on either of these two 
fundamental elements.32  
 
Yet, significantly, the Appeals Chamber also underscored that, ‘like the Trial Chamber’, it 
had ‘no doubt that grave crimes were committed against Serbs detained at the Srebrenica 
Police Station and the Building [a building behind the municipal building referred to in 
paragraph 22 of the Indictment against Orić] between September 1992 and March 1993’.33 
The acknowledgement by the Appeals Chamber that Orić’s forces did indeed carry out 
crimes against Serbs in Srebrenica helped to create a sense of ‘unfinished business’. Six years 
later, on 3 February 2014, Serbia issued a warrant for Orić’s arrest, linked to the killing of 
nine Serb civilians in Zalazje near Srebrenica on 12 July 1992.34 On 10 June 2015, Swiss 
authorities arrested Orić, triggering a political tug-of-war between Serbia and BiH. While the 
former sought Orić’s extradition to Serbia to stand trial there, the latter insisted that he must 
be sent back to BiH.  
 
Orić’s undecided fate overshadowed the preparations for the twentieth anniversary 
commemorations of Srebrenica. It remained uncertain how the Swiss authorities would 
respond to competing demands from Serbia and BiH; and amidst what Hodžić has described 
as ‘the manufactured cacophony of reactions and counter-reactions over Orić’s arrest’,35 
families of the dead and missing were left in limbo. On 23 June 2015, for example, the 
organizers of the commemorations threatened to cancel the memorial event in Potočari, 
unless the Swiss authorities extradited Orić back to BiH. Ćamil Duraković, Srebrenica’s 
mayor and the head of the organizing committee, raised security concerns about the event 
going ahead, claiming:  
 
The situation is alarming. I am afraid of what might happen after the expiry of his 
[Orić’s] detention…It will be disastrous if we get to July 11 with Naser being where he 
is now. Then indeed we cannot guarantee what people can do, especially the people of 
Srebrenica who apparently are the only ones in this case who have emotions for Naser 
Orić.36  
 
Such arguments were unconvincing and suggested that people cared more about Orić than 
they did about the victims of Srebrenica. Fundamentally, political considerations were 
driving the polemics surrounding Orić’s detention in Switzerland. How could the 2015 
commemorations go ahead with this ‘hero’37 of Srebrenica held in custody? Indeed 
Duraković himself, in urging BiH state authorities to establish direct contact with their 
counterparts in Bern, acknowledged that the Orić situation was ‘more a political than a legal 
issue’.38  
 
The Swiss authorities ultimately extradited Orić back to BiH. This was in accordance with 
European laws on extradition and the fact that Orić is a Bosnian national accused of crimes 
committed in BiH.39 He is now on trial at the State Court of BiH in Sarajevo (the trial began 
on 26 January 2016), together with Sahabudin Muhić, a former member of the Srebrenica 
Territorial Defence armed forces. The indictment against the two men was confirmed on 9 
September 2015 and both men pleaded not guilty on 19 October 2015. They are charged with 
war crimes against prisoners of war, in violation of Article 144 of the Criminal Code of the 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.40 According to Srebrenica’s mayor, ‘This 
indictment is a political document, against a hero of Srebrenica. If this is how the judiciary 
will work, then Bosniaks don’t need it’.41 This ‘politics of war heroism’ remains one of the 
enduring legacies of the Bosnian war – and one of the greatest obstacles to successful 
transitional justice. Indeed, according to the State Court of BiH, it has faced significant and 
‘intolerable’ pressure as a result of its proceedings against Orić.42 
 
Prime Minister Vučić’s visit to Potočari 
 
In July 2015, 136 victims were buried in Potočari, bringing the total number to over 6,000. 
Yet, they were not the main focus of the twentieth anniversary commemorations. Rather, it 
was the attack on the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, which took centre stage. 
According to one commentator, there has never been such a trading of human tragedy.43  
 
Up until the last minute, it was unclear whether Vučić would attend the commemorations. 
Having commenced his political career in 1993 as a member of the far-right Serbian Radical 
Party, led by the ultra-nationalist Vojislav Šešelj,44 Vučić is a deeply controversial figure in 
BiH. Just nine days after the fall of Srebrenica, in a speech delivered to the Serbian 
Parliament, he infamously declared – in response to NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb 
positions – that 100 Bosnian Muslims would be killed for every Serb killed.45 Inevitably, 
therefore, his visit to Potočari generated strong and diverse reactions. Following the official 
announcement that the Serbian Prime Minister would travel to Potočari, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
the President of the European Commission, declared:  
 
…I welcome the decision of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia to attend the 
commemoration. His decision is an example of the forward-looking approach that is 
required for the countries of the region to move ahead on their path to the European 
Union, where their future firmly lies.46  
 
 
In a similar vein, Al Jazeera confidently asserted that ‘Vučić’s attendance at the July 11 
ceremony in eastern Bosnia will be a landmark for the reconciliation among former Yugoslav 
republics after the 1990s wars that killed some 135,000 people’.47 The reality on the ground, 
however, was far more complex. Vučić was booed as he laid flowers on the Potočari 
memorial plaque; and some members of the crowd carried banners emblazoned with the 
words: ‘Vučiću, rekao si: Za jednog Srbina ubićemo 100 muslimana’ (Vučić, you said: For 
every Serb [killed], we will kill 100 Muslims) – a reference to his aforementioned speech in 
the Serbian Parliament. As the atmosphere grew increasingly tense, some members of the 
crowd began throwing stones and bottles at Vučić and his entourage. His glasses were broken 
and he was quickly bundled to safety. According to one commentator, Vučić, by being made 
to leave, may have understood for the first time how the victims of Srebrenica might have felt 
when they were forced to flee from General Ratko Mladić’s forces in 1995.48  
 
Vučić subsequently disclosed that he had received a warning from the Serbian Ministry of 
Interior Affairs and the Security-Information Agency the day before he travelled to 
Potočari.49 This later led him to admit that: ‘I made a mistake and I am not embarrassed to 
accept that’.50 The fact that he did not change his plans, however, necessarily raised 
important questions about his visit. Was it a genuine act of sincerity on his part, or simply a 
public relations stunt?  
 
In September 2015, during a regional evaluation workshop in Montenegro on the Women’s 
Court that took place in Sarajevo four months earlier,51 this author had an opportunity to 
speak to some of the women from Srebrenica who testified at the Court and to hear their 
views on Vučić’s visit to Potočari. They unanimously insisted that his motives were purely 
political. According to a Bosniak woman whose husband disappeared during the genocide 
and remains missing, the Serbian Prime Minister had no reason to go to Potočari and his visit 
was motivated by inat – which can be roughly translated as ‘spite’. Another witness, whose 
husband was killed in Potočari in 1992 by members of the ‘Tigers’ – a Serbian paramilitary 
unit – argued that Vučić simply went to Potočari in order to deflect attention from the 
victims. He became the ‘victim on the day’, she stressed, and everybody was talking about 
him. For her part, a Women’s Court witness whose husband was killed by Serbian forces in 
in the municipality of Zvornik, also in eastern BiH, described how, during the twentieth 
anniversary commemorations, all eyes were on Vučić. In her view, it was a ‘sramota’ 
(disgrace) that he did not allow the victims to be peacefully buried and that he took all the 
attention away from them.52 
 
In contrast, Vučić himself has maintained that he went to Potočari with good intentions. 
Speaking at a press conference after the attack, he declared: ‘…I express my sorrow that 
something like this happened, and I am sorry that some people did not recognize my honest 
intention of building friendship between Serbs and Bosniaks’.53 Accusing Serb football 
hooligans of having incited the attack, he further pronounced: ‘Bosniak friends and 
neighbours, I once again extend my hand to you, with sincerity, and do not worry about the 
fools who took part in this [incident]. There are such individuals everywhere’.54 Some 
Bosniaks themselves believe that Vučić attended the commemorations for the right reasons. 
The mayor of Srebrenica, Ćamil Duraković, for example, noted that ‘Vučić hugged 
Srebrenica mother Munira Subašić and attended the ceremony to honour the victims. He even 
placed a symbolic flower on his jacket to show his sympathy for our pain’;55 and according to 
the political commentator Hajrudin Somun, Vučić was visibly moved when he met some of 
the Mothers of Srebrenica.56  
 
These diverse reactions highlight one of the central issues surrounding apologies in post-
conflict societies: how do we know when they are genuine? According to Andrieu, apologies 
‘recreate the communication that has been lost through mass violence’.57  Yet, while Vučić 
apologized for what happened in Potočari on 11 July 2015, he did not apologize for what 
took place there 20 years earlier. The fact that his apology was thus incomplete necessarily 
affected how many people viewed it. As Lundy and Rolston underscore, ‘A disconnected, 
free-standing apology runs the risk of being less than authentic’.58 Four months after the 
twentieth anniversary commemorations, however, Vučić returned to Potočari. It was highly 
significant, politically and symbolically, that Bakir Izetbegović, a member of BiH’s tripartite 
presidency, accompanied him.59 A week earlier, moreover, the Bosnian and Serbian 
governments held their first joint session in Sarajevo, with the declared aim of improving 
relations between the two countries; and Vučić announced that he wanted Serbia to become 
BiH’s main trading partner.60 All of these developments are important. Govier and Verwoerd 
highlight that ‘The issuing of a statement of apology is a short event, but such a statement 
should initiate a process showing commitment to reform and practical amends’.61 By the time 
of Vučić’s second visit to Potočari, it can be argued that this process had been set in motion. 
 
Whatever the genuine reason for his first visit, what is certain is that Vučić’s presence at the 
Potočari Memorial Centre on 11 July critically detracted from the purpose of 
memorialization. The twentieth anniversary commemorations should have been an occasion 
for quiet reflection and remembrance, but high politics dominated the event and victims were 
thus pushed into the background. Highlighting this point, Munira Subašić, the president of the 
Mothers of the Enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa, described the attack on Vučić as ‘an attack 
on us mothers, on the victims, on our dignity’.62 Keen to return the focus to where it should 
be, Reis-l-ulema Husein Kavazović, the head of the Islamic Community in BiH, strongly 
denounced the incident, while also pointing out that the humiliation and embarrassment 
which Vučić suffered in Potočari were nothing compared to the pain that the Mothers of 
Srebrenica have had to bear for years.63  
 
If Vučić’s presence in Potočari helped to sideline victims, it also created divides within 
victims’ groups. One of the most poignant and memorable moments of Vučić’s visit was 
when Hatidža Mehmedović, who lost her husband, two sons and two brothers in the 
genocide, pinned the green and white handmade Srebrenica flower onto Vučić’s jacket and 
welcomed him to Potočari. As she later explained, she does not want young people in Serbia 
to carry the burden of the past, adding that: ‘I will fight for as long as I am alive for every 
child to have a normal childhood and a bright future’.64 For her part, Munira Subašić 
disclosed that she had wanted to help Vučić when he was attacked but had quickly lost sight 
of him.65 On one hand, such gestures on the part of women like Mehmedović and Subašić 
might be seen as small steps on the long and sinuous path towards reconciliation. On the 
other hand, some of the Mothers of Srebrenica reacted very negatively to them. During the 
author’s aforementioned discussions in Montenegro, in September 2015, with some of the 
witnesses who testified at the Women’s Court in Sarajevo, those from Srebrenica and the 
surrounding areas were unanimous in their conviction that the leaders of their associations 
had betrayed them. ‘Why did they not leave when Vučić arrived?’ one witness asked.  ‘Why 
did they welcome him?’ If Vučić’s visit to Potočari thus fostered and/or exacerbated internal 
divides and tensions within associations like the Mothers of the Enclaves of Srebrenica and 
Žepa, it also underscored that ‘victims’ are not a homogenous group who speak with one 
voice.66  
 
Fundamentally, the polemics and controversies surrounding Orić’s arrest and Vučić’s 
decision to go to Potočari detracted from the victims of Srebrenica. If, as this article 
maintains, they thus highlight the importance of developing more bottom-up forms of 
transitional justice that put victims and their needs first, they also raise a key question which 
the remaining sections of this article address, namely: what might more community-led ways 
of commemorating the dead of Srebrenica, alongside the official annual commemorations, 
look like? 
 
Green transitional justice 
 
Transitional justice processes are intended to benefit victims by, inter alia, giving them an 
opportunity to be heard, to have their suffering acknowledged and to find out the truth. While 
these goals are important, they are generic and do not address victims’ contextually-specific 
needs. Given that transitional justice is often driven from the top down,67 too many 
assumptions are often made about victims and what they require.68 Not only is this deeply 
disempowering, but it can help to create major disconnects and ‘frictions’69 between the 
aspirations of transitional justice and on-the-ground realities.70 It is important, therefore, as 
Doak underlines, that victims are ‘afforded the respect and dignity of being treated as 
individuals with their own specific needs and rights which need to be safeguarded by legal 
and political processes’.71 In order to address significant ‘victim deficits’ within transitional 
justice, some scholars have called for more bottom-up and inclusive forms of justice that 
counter-balance top-down processes and give a greater role to victims.72 This article both 
builds upon this critical body of literature and develops it in a new ‘green’ direction. 
 
Dimensions of ‘greening’ 
 
‘Greening’ has occurred within many different fields. Opotow and Clayton, for example, 
write about ‘green justice’, defining this as ‘conceptions of fairness toward the natural 
world…’.73 Dominelli utilizes the term ‘green social work’, to refer to social workers 
operating on the ground in the aftermath of environmental disasters.74 Hamilton examines the 
‘greening’ of nationalism, by focusing on nationalist parties – such as Plaid Cmyru and the 
Scottish National Party – that embrace green issues.75 This article further adds to these 
‘green’ examples by introducing the novel concept of ‘green’ transitional justice. In so doing, 
it draws on the field of ‘green criminology’. 
 
Lynch first introduced the idea of green criminology during the mid-1980s, to emphasize ‘the 
importance of studying environmental issues in the modern era given the vast environmental 
impacts humans have on local environments and on the world environmental system…’.76 
While green criminology, thus, is fundamentally about exploring and addressing 
environmental crimes and harms, green transitional justice – as it is defined and theorized in 
this article – is about utilizing nature and the environment in the complex process of dealing 
with the past and addressing harms done to others. Precisely because it is a bottom-up 
concept, it is local communities who drive green transitional justice, and this, in turn, allows 
for a far closer alignment between process and needs. Concomitantly, it also allows for the 
exposure of certain harms that more top-down approaches may miss or ignore. Genocide, for 
example, creates meta narratives,77 but embedded within these narratives are varied 
‘microhistories’78 and, by extension, micro harms. Green criminology, similarly, is about 
drawing attention to types of harms that traditional criminology has ignored. Fundamentally, 
it looks beyond state-defined ‘crime’ to consider a much broader and more diverse set of 
harms.79 In this regard, green criminology can be construed as a mainly bottom-up concept;80 
it is the harms themselves and how they affect societies and environments that are key, not 
the definitions that they are accorded and the top-down priorities assigned to them. 
Highlighting this point, Short has applied the concept of green criminology to the study of 
genocide, to draw attention to genocides that have received little attention – including those 
committed by First World nations – and to ‘the plight of the victims’81. Green transitional 
justice goes one step further. It is not only about highlighting the plight of victims, but about 
empowering them to express what it is that they need from transitional justice processes.  
 
Green transitional justice from concept to practice 
 
The relationship between nature and transitional justice is completely unexplored within 
existing scholarship. Positive empirical examples of this relationship do exist, however, even 
though they are not explicitly framed as green transitional justice. As one illustration, this 
author recently spent a year in BiH, as part of a Leverhulme Research Fellowship.82 During 
this fieldwork, she worked closely with Snaga Žene, a Bosnian NGO based in Tuzla83 that 
supports trauma victims, from war rape survivors and families living in collective centres to 
women who lost their loved-ones in the Srebrenica genocide. Focused on occupational and 
horticultural therapy,84 Snaga Žene’s work is characterized by a holistic approach to post-
trauma healing that harnesses the therapeutic properties of nature and the environment.  
Providing victims with the resources to, inter alia, grow and harvest (and in some cases sell) 
their own fruit, vegetables and herbs, the NGO seeks to improve their physical and mental 
well-being,85 to restore their confidence and sense of self-respect and to contribute to their 
economic empowerment. Snaga Žene pioneered this model in Srebrenica in 2006, as part of 
its Cvjetna dolina (Flower Valley) project. The NGO’s exceptional work in Srebrenica (and 
in nearby Potočari and Bratunac), which is ongoing through its new Cvjetne bašte (Flower 
Gardens) project,86 has given many women there a new lease of life and sense of purpose, as 
well as an opportunity to voice and articulate their wants, needs and aspirations. It also offers 
a concrete example of bottom-up, needs-based transitional justice. 
 
Snaga Žene’s activities constitute part of a wider ‘green approach’ to healing and 
community-building in the aftermath of conflict and social upheaval. In 1996, for example, a 
group of refugee women from BiH initiated the creation of an inter-cultural garden in 
Göttingen, Germany. These gardens have facilitated and encouraged inter-cultural exchange, 
as well as enabling individuals to work on themselves. To cite Moulin-Doos,  
 
The experience of intercultural gardens enables migrants, in their capacity as gardeners, 
to landscape and tend this land, and often to regain lost self-respect. By producing and 
sharing experience, knowledge, and products, members of intercultural gardens recover 
a sense of their own worth which may have been lost in situations of social exclusion or 
uprooting. This regaining of self-respect then becomes the first step towards developing 
mutual respect.87 
 
 
In the year 2000, the American Friends Service Committee brought a variant of the inter-
cultural garden to BiH, by establishing the Community Gardens Association (CGA) as an 
organic community gardening project. According to Vesna Malenica from the CGA, 
community gardens have an increasingly important role to play in post-war BiH. If practical 
concerns, like putting food on the table and re-building their homes, dominated people’s 
everyday lives in the immediate aftermath of the war, ‘[n]ow psychological problems have 
room to surface’.88 The two main gardens are in Stup (central Sarajevo) and in Kula (East 
Sarajevo). All of the gardens are multi-ethnic and represent significant experiments in 
‘peacebuilding from below’.89 As Helphand observes, ‘In Sarajevo, these gardens both 
attempt to let the society move on and attempt to re-create the prewar peace among the city’s 
diverse inhabitants’.90  
 
A ‘green’ approach has also been used in post-conflict Sierra Leone to complement official 
transitional justice processes. In the aftermath of the country’s 11-year civil war (1991-2002), 
both the Special Court for Sierra Leone and a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) 
were established. In 2007, concerned that these institutions were not sufficiently reaching out 
to local communities, particularly in rural areas, John Caulker, the chairman of the TRC 
Working Group, founded Fambul Tok (Family Talk in Krio).91 Described by Iliff as 
representing ‘an important innovation in grassroots TJ [transitional justice] in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’,92 Fambul Tok aims at facilitating reconciliation and healing. The process culminates 
in a bonfire ceremony in which both perpetrators and victims are encouraged to speak and to 
reconcile with each other.93 Once the ceremony is over, Fambul Tok continues to work with 
communities to aid reconciliation. Common projects include the creation of peace gardens94 
and community farms. Graybill notes that in Kailahun,95 for example, ‘…people have begun 
farming together again – something that had not been practiced since before the war’.96 At 
the end of Fambul Tok’s second year, 30 community farms had been established in four 
districts.97  
 
What all of these examples powerfully illustrate is that transitional justice is not just about 
institutions – courts, TRCs, fact-finding bodies – and macro agendas. It is also about victims 
(and local communities) and how they deal with the past, heal and move on with their lives; 
and it is about giving them the tools to do so. The work of Snaga Žene, the CGA and Fambul 
Tok demonstrates that nature can be a valuable part of this process. By extension, nature can 
play a significant role in commemorations. Introducing and exploring the concept of ‘green’ 
memorials, the final part of this article argues that green memorials potentially offer an 
important bottom-up and ‘everyday’ complement to the annual state-led commemorations of 
the Srebrenica genocide. 
 
Green memorials  
 
Although memorials are a relatively under-explored dimension of transitional justice,98 the 
relationship between nature and memorials has been discussed and examined in a variety of 
different contexts. In their work on the World War Two Birkenau and Plaszow camps, for 
example, which they approach as ‘ecological landscapes’ – to emphasize ‘the macro-
ecological features that would be obvious to any visitor and would thereby influence their 
experience of the place’99 – Charlesworth and Addis essentially look at how nature impacts 
on memorials and the way that they function. As one illustration, a plan was introduced at 
Birkenau to effectively use nature to help preserve the integrity of the memorial site. The plan 
included ‘the conservation of the trees extant in 1943/44 and the replanting of identical 
species at places where the records and survivors indicated they had been’.100 However, this 
plan developed into a ‘managed ecology of tidiness’ and thus impacted on visitors’ 
experience of the memorial site, both by ‘taming’ it101 and by altering how the victims are 
represented. ‘Uniform lawns’, the authors maintain, ‘are more likely to let us regard the 
victims as the authorities did, as “Figuren”, objects, a mass’.102  
 
If, in the example of Birkenau, nature – and more specifically its management – effectively 
de-authenticated the site, this research argues that nature and the environment also offer 
possibilities for creating new sites – chosen, designed and managed by local communities – 
to memorialize the dead. A notable example in this regard is the ‘1965 Park’ in Bali, 
Indonesia. From 1965 to 1966, 500,000 to one million Balinese were killed in anti-
communist massacres in Bali. Forty years later, a group of young people, whose parents and 
grandparents survived the violence, proposed the creation of a memorial to commemorate the 
victims. According to Dwyer,  
 
Inspired by transnational discourses of transitional justice and reconciliation that stress 
the importance of publicly articulating the truths of the past, these young people hoped 
to create a monument to a community’s suffering that could act as a catalyst to local 
political transformation and as a liberatory challenge to erasure of the massacres from 
official Indonesian histories.103  
 
Consisting of a small area of lawn, and surrounded by a low wall of concrete inset with 
stones that form the numbers ‘1965, 1965, 1965’, the  Park is an illustration of both bottom-
up transitional justice and green memorialization. What it also fundamentally highlights, 
however, is that neither of these concepts should be idealized or treated as unproblematic. 
The 1965 Park raised difficult and complex questions about memory – and about suffering 
and its representation – and significant grassroots divides quickly began to emerge along 
different axes. One of these was a generational axis. Those who had lived through the 
violence, for example, were often reluctant to narrate their experiences in detail, which 
frustrated the younger generation.104 The latter, in turn, antagonized the elders by 
increasingly speaking of 1965 as ‘“their history” as well as their elders’, despite the fact that 
most of them had been born after the violence’.105 In other words, the past became an inter-
generational site of struggle and contested meaning. Divides also manifested themselves 
along a gendered axis. Some female survivors – and in particular those who had suffered 
sexual assaults – had highly sensitive stories that they struggled to share, or simply did not 
wish to share. Yet, these women were not always shown the understanding and respect that 
they deserved. As Dwyer notes, ‘…women who showed ambivalence about openly sharing 
their memories were cast by the younger people as ignorant of politics or trapped by a 
misplaced maternal protectiveness inherent to a feminine self’.106  
 
What the example of the 1965 Park in Bali powerfully underscores is that transitional justice 
requires contextual sensitivity. Something that works in one community or society may not 
work in another. Just as every conflict is unique and has its own particular dynamics, so too 
every post-conflict environment is unique with its own specific challenges and needs.  The 
fact, therefore, that green memorialization proved deeply divisive in the Balinese context 
does not mean that it would be similarly schismatic in a community such as Srebrenica. A 
major difference between the two is that, in contrast to Bali, a variety of transitional justice 
work has already been done in Srebrenica, including through the ICTY’s trials. The fact, 
moreover, that Srebrenica has received so much attention from, inter alia, international 
donors, NGOs, the media and researchers means that the past is kept alive and regularly 
discussed. This has created space for divisions to appear among the victims of the Srebrenica, 
as they did during the 2015 commemorations, and to be addressed. The situation in Bali is 
very different, and one of the conclusions that can be drawn from the 1965 Park is that the 
context has to be ‘ripe’ for green memorials. They are likely to work better alongside, and as 
a complement to, other transitional justice processes, rather than as stand-alone memorials 
that unearth issues which have hitherto been neither discussed nor dealt with. 
 
It is argued that green memorials can be usefully developed within the meta framework of 
civic ecology, which essentially refers to neighbours and communities coming together in 
pursuit of a common purpose. In the words of Tidball et al.,  
 
…civic ecology practices, including urban community forestry, community gardening, 
and other self-organized forms of stewardship of green spaces in cities…are 
manifestations of how social and ecological memories can be instrumentalized through 
social learning to foster SES resilience [social-ecological system] following crisis and 
disaster.107  
 
An important example of civic ecology in practice is the Living Memorials Project, which 
was set up after 9/11.  Led by the United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service, it 
is an initiative, according to the Project’s website, which ‘invokes the resonating power of 
trees to bring people together and create lasting, living memorials to the victims of terrorism, 
their families, communities, and the nation’.108 As part of this grassroots-oriented project 
focused on local needs, more than 200 open public spaces have been created to help 
communities find their own ways of dealing with the tragedy. Svendsen and Campbell, for 
example, explain that in the months following 9/11, it emerged that ‘…communities needed 
public space to establish a locus of control, to create, to teach, and to engage in the physical 
act of restoration’.109 Reversing the sense of powerlessness and vulnerability which crime 
engenders and entrenches, in short, is a fundamental part of any healing process. Another 
example of civic ecology is Hike for Katreena, a non-profit organization established by New 
Orleans resident Monique Pilié to raise awareness of the ecological damage wreaked by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Committed to replanting the tens of thousands of trees which the 
hurricane destroyed, the organization’s website states: ‘We invite participation from 
volunteer groups, schools, environmental and non-profit groups, local and national businesses 
and committed individuals…’.110 
 
Although the examples of Hike for Katreena and the Living Memorials Project are 
contextually specific, and do not relate to post-conflict societies, civic ecology can 
nevertheless contribute to transitional justice – and particularly to memorialization and 
remembrance. Firstly, as this article has demonstrated, high-profile memorial events like 
those in Potočari can easily become as much about politics as remembrance. This 
politicization, in turn, creates contextual dislocation, disconnecting commemorative events 
from the everyday lives of families of the dead.111 Civic ecology potentially offers a way of 
bringing memorialization back to victims and giving these groups greater control over how 
their dead are remembered and respected. By organizing their own ‘greening activities’,112 
such as planting trees and establishing memorial gardens, victims can actively and positively 
interact with the living memorials they create.  
 
Secondly, a key element of civic ecology is building resilience113 through human-nature 
interactions. During their research in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, for example, 
Tidball et al. found that ‘…trees and replanting trees were critical in bolstering people’s 
resolve to rebuild their lives…’;114 and Helpland describes how ‘Gardens promise beauty 
where there is none, hope over despair, optimism over pessimism, and finally life in the face 
of death’.115 Building resilience, in turn, is a fundamental part of transitional justice. The 
latter is about enabling societies to deal with a legacy of past war crimes and/or mass human 
rights violations; and as part of this process, communities and individuals within those 
societies must channel their inner resources and find their own ways of coming to terms with 
the past. Civic ecology can potentially help them to do this.  
 
Thirdly, one of the purposes of transitional justice is to facilitate improved relations in post-
conflict communities and societies. Ultimately, however, reconciliation has to be built from 
the bottom up,116 in the everyday interactions that people have with each other.117 In this 
regard, civic ecology is valuable because it not only creates opportunities for these 
interactions, but it also provides a basis for the formulation of common goals. This is 
important both for helping to bring fractured communities together and for giving them a new 
future-oriented focus. Those who have experienced violence and mass human rights 
violations can easily become ‘stuck’ in the past and unable to think about the future.118 
 
The aforementioned examples of green memorials discussed in this section are diverse, and it 
is not the author’s intention to suggest, to reiterate, that something that works in one society 
can be ‘cut and pasted’ into another. This article expressly rejects a template, ‘cooker cutter’ 
approach to transitional justice; and indeed it emphasizes the importance of developing more 
bottom-up ways of doing transitional justice precisely to underscore that victims have their 
own contextually-specific needs and requirements. By considering a variety of examples 
from a range of different societies, what this section has expressly sought to highlight is that 
green memorials already exist. In other words, although the concept itself is novel, its 
practical translation is not. This distinction between concept and practice is fundamental. The 
aim of this article has been to advance the idea of green memorials. As a practice, however, it 
can only take shape at the local level, according to individual and community needs. 
Accordingly, this research has deliberately refrained from suggesting how communities in 
Srebrenica and Potočari might utilize and develop green memorials. Only they themselves 
can decide this – and indeed whether they support the idea of green memorials.   
 
Green criminology, a concept that underpins this article, is about addressing ‘green’ harms – 
and the human rights abuses which potentially result from them.119 Green transitional justice 
is specifically about ‘green’ responses to human harms. Neither concept, however, prescribes 
uniform or de-contextualized responses. Hall and Farrall’s core description of ‘environmental 
justice’ – an important strand of green criminology – is equally applicable to green 
transitional justice. Both of them, in short, are about ‘the involvement of people and 
community in decisions’ which might affect them and their environment, broadly defined.120 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article began by focusing on the twentieth anniversary commemorations of the 
Srebrenica genocide. It sought to show how the arrest of Naser Orić and the attack on the 
Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, overshadowed the anniversary and detracted from 
the victims and their suffering. The core aim of this research, thus, was to examine whether 
there are more grassroots ways of memorializing the dead of Srebrenica that counter-balance 
the state-led annual commemorations in Potočari. In so doing, it sought not to downplay the 
importance of the annual commemorations but, rather, to develop a framework for creating 
more holistic memorial practices. Highlighting various examples of ‘greening’ within 
different academic disciplines, and drawing in particular on the field of ‘green criminology’, 
it introduced the concept of ‘green’ transitional justice and the concomitant notion of ‘green’ 
memorials. It has argued that the inclusion of nature and the environment in the process of 
dealing with the past offers unexplored ways of building more bottom-up forms of 
transitional justice that empower victims and local communities, by allowing them to make 
their own decisions and to set their own goals. Although this article is the first to coin the 
term, green transitional justice is already occurring in diverse post-conflict societies; and 
similarly, many examples of green memorials already exist.  It remains to be seen whether 
green transitional justice will ultimately become a burgeoning field like green criminology. 
Quintessentially, however, the concept is about hope and renewal. In the words of Jeb 
Dickersen, ‘A setting sun still whispers a promise for tomorrow’.121 This is the essence of 
green transitional justice. 
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